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A new class of quantum cryptography (QC) protocols that are robust against the most gen-
eral photon number splitting attacks in a weak coherent pulse implementation has been recently
proposed. In this article we give a quite exhaustive analysis of several eavesdropping attacks on
these schemes. The eavesdropper (Eve) is supposed to have unlimited technological power while the
honest parties (Alice and Bob) use present day technology, in particular an attenuated laser as an
approximation of a single-photon source. They exploit the nonorthogonality of quantum states for
decreasing the information accessible to Eve in the multi-photon pulses accidentally produced by
the imperfect source. An implementation of some of these protocols using present day technology
allow for a secure key distribution up to distances of ∼ 150 km. We also show that strong-pulse
implementations, where a strong pulse is included as a reference, allow for key distribution robust
against photon number splitting attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography, or more precisely, quantum
key distribution (QKD) followed by the one-time pad, is
the only secure way of transmitting secret information
(see [1] for a review). Its security is not based on some
mathematical assumptions, such as a limited eavesdrop-
per’s computational power, but on the laws of Quantum
Mechanics. Because of the Heisenberg’s uncertainty prin-
ciple, a measurement on a quantum system modifies the
system itself. Thus, Eve’s measurement on a quantum
state carrying sender’s information produces a change on
the state that can be noticed by Alice and Bob. The se-
curity of QKD schemes can also be understood in terms
of the no-cloning theorem [2]. Eve cannot make and keep
a perfect copy of the quantum state carrying the infor-
mation from Alice to Bob [3].
Most of the known QKD protocols use two-dimensional
quantum states, called qubits, as information carriers, al-
though there exist alternative proposals using higher di-
mensional systems, either finite [4] or infinite [5]. The
information encoding can be performed by means of any
two-dimensional quantum state, but very often this is
done using photons that are sent through an optical fiber,
the quantum channel. Therefore, Alice, must be able to
prepare and send single photons to Bob. The existence
of single-photon sources is then an implicit and crucial
requirement for many of the proposed implementation of
the existent schemes. Since there are no practical single-
photon sources available, Alice generally uses a weak co-
herent pulse, |µeiθ〉, with mean photon number µ≪ 1, as
an approximation of the single-photon pulse. Moreover,
since there is no phase reference outside Alice’s lab, the
effective state used for the information encoding is
ρ =
∫
dθ
2pi
|µeiθ〉〈µeiθ| =
∑
n
p(n, µ)|n〉〈n|, (1)
with the number n of photons distributed according to
a Poisson statistics of mean µ, p(n, µ) = e−µµn/n! [6,7].
Thus, instead of the ideal one-photon Fock state, Alice
produces a zero-photon state with probability p(0, µ), a
one-photon state with probability p(1, µ) and so on.
Intuitively, the presence of pulses with more than one
photon may deteriorate the security of the protocol, since
a perfect copy of the quantum state is then produced by
the imperfect single-photon source. Indeed, it was shown
in [7,8] that the presence of these multi-photon pulses
makes the best-known QKD protocol, the BB84 scheme
[9], insecure if the losses in the channel become impor-
tant. Eve can then perform the so-called photon number
splitting (PNS) attack that allows her to get full infor-
mation without being detected. This limits the distance
up to which BB84 with weak coherent pulses and lossy
optical fibers can be securely implemented. For typical
experimental parameters this critical distance, dc, is of
the order of 50 km. As we will show below, similar con-
clusions are valid for weak pulse implementations of other
QKD schemes, such as the B92 [10] and the 4+2 protocol
[11].
Recently, new quantum cryptography protocols have
been proposed that are more robust against PNS attacks
[12]. The scope of the present article is to give a detailed
security analysis of these protocols under different eaves-
dropping scenarios. In the next section we review the
PNS attack for the BB84 scheme, and we show how the
same results and conclusions also apply for the B92 and
4+2 protocols. Then, we discuss QKD implementations
including a strong reference pulse as a first possibility for
minimizing the importance of PNS attacks. Moreover,
the results of section II give us some insight into the re-
quirements needed for a QKD protocol to be resistant
to PNS attacks in a weak pulse implementations. The
family of investigated protocols is presented in section
III. We will focus on a particular one, that differs from
BB84 only in the classical sifting procedure for extracting
the key. We will consider various possible attacks, some
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which do not introduce errors, some which use cloning
machines (which do introduce some errors), and some
which are the combination of both. We briefly discuss
the experimental data of [13] in the light of our results,
as an example of a QKD implementation secure against
PNS attacks. At the end, we also explore possible gener-
alizations. The last section summarizes the main results.
Let us end the introduction with four important re-
marks about our results. First, in order to make a fair
comparison between all the analyzed protocols, we take
as a reference the BB84 scheme using µ = 0.1, i.e. for all
the protocols the raw rate at very large distances must be
the same as in this reference scheme. Second, we do not
consider advantage distillation protocols for secret-key
distillation (see for instance [14]). Therefore, a protocol
is said secure if and only if the information Alice-Bob is
greater than Eve’s information. Indeed, it was shown in
[15] that secret-key distillation is possible using one-way
privacy amplification whenever
IAB > min(IAE , IBE). (2)
Third, although Eve is supposed to have unlimited tech-
nological power, we assume that she is not able to ma-
nipulate Bob’s detector (contrary to what is done in Ref.
[8]). This is a crucial point for our analysis [16]. In-
deed, let us suppose that Eve can modify the detector
efficiency, ηdet, in such a way that it is equal to one for
those instances where she has got the full information
(her attack is successful). If we take ηdet = 0.1, our re-
sults should be modified (see for instance Eq. (4)) by a
factor of ten, which means a factor of 10 dB, or equiva-
lently of 40 km, in all our curves. And four, we do not
take into account coherent attacks, where Eve interacts
with more than one pulse [17].
II. THE PNS ATTACK
Any experimental realization using photons of a QKD
protocol with two-dimensional quantum states must ide-
ally be performed with a single-photon source. Unfortu-
nately, this is a very strong requirement with present day
technology, and one has to design a way of experimen-
tally approximating the single-photon source. In spite
of the fact that QKD has proven to be unconditionally
secure (see for instance [18]), this may not be the case
any longer if the technology of the honest parties is not
perfect.
In most of the existent implementations, the one-
photon pulse is approximated by a weak coherent pulse
|µeiθ〉. As said above, and since there is no absolute
phase reference, the state seen by Bob and Eve is given
by Eq. (1), an incoherent mixture of multi-photon states
with Poisson probabilities. Eve can then perform a pho-
ton number non-demolition measurement, keep one of the
photons when a multi-photon state is found, and forward
the rest to Bob. Note that Eve’s action is not detected by
Bob if he is assumed to have only access to the average
detection rate, and not to the statistics of the photons he
receives. We also assume that Eve is able to control the
losses on the line connecting Alice and Bob (or equiva-
lently she can send photons to Bob by a lossless line). In
this situation, Eve can perform the so-called PNS attack
that, as we show below, limits the security of many of
the known existing protocols.
A. The BB84 protocol
In the BB84 protocol [9], Alice chooses at random be-
tween two mutually unbiased bases, in which she encodes
a classical bit. Denoting by | ± x〉 (| ± y〉) the eigenvec-
tors of σx (σy) with eigenvalue ±1, she can encode a
logical 0 into either |+ x〉 or |+ y〉 and a 1 into either
| − x〉 or | − y〉. She sends the qubit to Bob, who mea-
sures at random in the x or y basis. Then, they compare
the basis and when they coincide, the bit is accepted. In
this way, half of the symbols are rejected, and, in the
absence of perturbations, they end with a shared secret
key. In practical situations, and due to the presence of
errors and possibly a spy, some error correction and pri-
vacy amplification techniques have to be applied, in order
to extract a shorter completely secure key.
Now, let us see how Eve can take advantage of the
multi-photon pulses. Alice sends a pulse with µ ≪ 1
coding the classical bit (say on light polarization). Eve
performs the photon number measurement and when two
or more photons are detected, she takes one and forward
the rest to Bob by her lossless line. Eve stores the pho-
ton in a quantum memory and waits until the basis rec-
onciliation. Once the basis is announced, she has only
to distinguish between two orthogonal states, which can
be done deterministically. Thus, for all the multi-photon
pulses Eve obtains all the information about the sent bit.
If Alice and Bob are in principle connected by a lossy line,
Eve can block some of the single-photon pulses, and for-
ward the multi-photon pulses, on which she can obtain
the whole information, by her lossless line. In this way,
Alice and Bob do not notice any change in the expected
raw rate, and Eve remains undetected. When the losses
are such that Eve can block all the single-photon pulses,
the protocol ceases to be secure.
Denote by α the losses in dB per km on the line. The
expected raw rate at Bob’s side is giving by
RBob = µ 10
−δ/10 [photons/pulse], (3)
where δ = αd is the total attenuation in dB of the quan-
tum channel of length d. Eve will apply the PNS attack
on a fraction 1− q of the pulses. Since she does not want
to be detected, the raw rate must not change, i.e. she
has to choose q in such a way that
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RPNSBob = qµ+ (1− q)RBB84 = RBob, (4)
where RBB84 ≡
∑∞
n=2 pn(n−1) [19]. Eve’s information is
zero when she does nothing, and one for the PNS attack,
i.e. denoting by SBB84 ≡
∑
n=2 pn,
Ieve(q) =
(1 − q)SBB84
q + (1− q)SBB84 . (5)
If the losses are such that q can be zero in Eq. (4) (all
the one-photon pulses can be blocked), Eve gets all the
information, without being detected. The critical atten-
uation, δc, is then given by the condition RBB84 = RBob.
In figure 1 we show the variation of Ieve as a function of d
for µ = 0.1 and α = 0.25dB/km [20]. The critical atten-
uation in this case is δc = 13 dB, and the corresponding
distance dc = 52 km. Two important points have to be
stressed here. First, we do not claim the optimality of
the PNS strategies we consider in this section from the
point of view of Eve’s information for losses lower than
δc. Indeed, when the losses begin to be relevant, it is
more convenient for Eve to perform the PNS attack on
all the multi-photon pulses and block some of the single-
photon pulses. One can see that this slightly increase
Ieve, but does not change the critical distance, as defined
in this article. Second, alternative and more conservative
definitions of the critical distance can be proposed. For
simplicity, we consider no perturbations in the absence
of Eve, i.e. the information Alice-Bob, IAB , is one. But
in realistic situations and due to the presence of errors
(for instance due to detector and optical noise) this is not
true, and the critical distance corresponds to the point
where Ieve = IAB. If the error rate is important, this
distance may be smaller than the one indicated here. In
any case, for channel attenuations greater than δc, the
implementation of the BB84 protocol using weak coher-
ent pulses is not secure.
One may wonder whether this attack is only possible
because the information is encoded on light polarization.
However the same reasoning is also valid for other encod-
ings such as, for instance, in the time-bin scheme (see [1]).
There the information is transmitted using the relative
phase between two weak coherent pulses that are sent
through the fiber. In principle, the state leaving Alice’s
side is |φ〉 = |µeiθ〉|µeiθeiφ〉 where φ = 0, pi (φ = ±pi/2)
correspond to ±x (±y). But since there is no phase ref-
erence, the effective state seen by Eve and Bob is
ρ =
∫
dθ
2pi
|φ〉〈φ| =
∑
n
p(n, 2µ)|ϕn(φ)〉〈ϕn(φ)|, (6)
where p(n, 2µ) are Poisson probabilities of mean photon
number 2µ and
|ϕn(φ)〉 =
n∑
m=0
√(
n
m
)
1
2n
eimφ|n−m〉|m〉. (7)
Note that Bob’s state is given by an expression like (6)
multiplying the mean photon number by the channel at-
tenuation. It is possible to define a creation and annihi-
lation operator
a†(φ) =
a†1 + e
iφa†2√
2
a(φ) =
a1 + e
−iφa2√
2
, (8)
such that acting on the two-mode vacuum state gives
a†(φ)|0, 0〉 = |ϕ1(φ)〉. It is straightforward to see that
|ϕn(φ)〉 = (a
†(φ))n√
n!
|0, 0〉, (9)
[a†, a] = 1 and 〈ϕn′(φ)|ϕn(φ)〉 = δn,n′ . Thus, the situa-
tion is the same as in the previous polarization encoding
scheme [7]. Eve can count the total number of photons in
the two (now temporal) modes, in an analogous way as in
the previous photon number measurement for polariza-
tion, without being noticed by Bob. When “more than
one” photons are detected, i.e. she projects into |ϕ2〉,
she stores one copy of the state in her quantum memory
until the basis reconciliation. Obviously, the equations
and critical values in this case are the same as the ones
found above for the polarization encoding scheme.
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FIG. 1. Eve’s information as a function of the distance for
the PNS attacks described in the text.
B. The B92 protocol
An alternative QKD scheme is given by the B92 pro-
tocol [10]. The classical bit is simply encoded by Al-
ice using two non-orthogonal states, |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 with
〈ψ0|ψ1〉 6= 0. Without loosing generality we will take [21]
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|ψ0〉 =
(
cos η2
sin η2
)
|ψ1〉 =
(
cos η2
− sin η2
)
, (10)
with 0 ≤ η ≤ pi/2 and the overlap is |〈ψ0|ψ1〉| = cos η.
Bob has to distinguish between two non-orthogonal
quantum states, and this can only be done with some
probability. The measurement optimizing this probabil-
ity is defined by the following positive operators, sum-
ming up to one [22],
Π0 =
1
1 + cos η
|ψ⊥1 〉〈ψ⊥1 |
Π1 =
1
1 + cos η
|ψ⊥0 〉〈ψ⊥0 |
Π? = 1 −Π0 −Π1, (11)
where |ψ⊥〉 denotes the state orthogonal to |ψ〉. When
Bob’s measurement outcome is the one associated to Πi,
with i = 0, 1, he knows that the state was |ψi〉. The
probability of obtaining an inconclusive result is equal
to the overlap between the states, p? = 〈ψ0|Π?|ψ0〉 =
〈ψ1|Π?|ψ1〉 = cos η. Thus, Alice and Bob will accept the
sent bit only for those cases where Bob’s measurement
gives a conclusive result. The probability of acceptance
is pok = 1− cos η, while for the BB84 this probability is
equal to one half. Eve’s PNS attack is described in the
following lines.
In a weak pulse encoding scheme, this protocol is
clearly insecure. What Eve can simply do is to perform
the same unambiguous measurement as Bob. When a
conclusive result is found, she knows the state and she
prepares a copy of it on Bob’s side. When Eve is not able
to determine the state, she blocks the pulse. Of course,
as soon as we have some losses in the channel Alice and
Bob cannot detect the eavesdropping (since they assume
that the absence of signal is due to the losses), and the
protocol is insecure. Note that no quantum memory and
lossless line is needed by Eve in this case.
C. The 4+2 protocol
A third QKD protocol was proposed in [11] combining
some of the ideas of the B92 and BB84 schemes. As in
the BB84 protocol, there are four states grouped into two
sets {|0a〉, |1a〉}, {|0b〉, |1b〉}. However, as in the B92, the
states in each set are not orthogonal, their overlaps being
|〈0a|1a〉| = |〈0b|1b〉| = cos η. The situation is depicted in
figure 2, the four states lie on the same parallel of the
Bloch sphere. Thus, Alice chooses randomly in which
of the two sets the bit is encoded. Bob performs at ran-
dom one of the two POVMs distinguishing the two states
of each set. After basis reconciliation, they determine all
the cases where Bob has applied the correct measurement
obtaining a conclusive result. At first sight, this protocol
seems more resistant against PNS attacks: compared to
the BB84 case, Eve can keep some of the photons but
her measurement after the basis reconciliation may not
be conclusive. And compared to the B92 case, she does
not know which of the two measurements has to be ap-
plied. However, and due to the particular geometry of
the sets of states, this scheme does not offer any advan-
tage over the two previous ones. But before describing
Eve’s attack, let us show how the three-outcome POVM
described by (11) can be interpreted as the concatenation
of two two-outcome measurements.
x
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FIG. 2. Set of states needed for the 4+2 protocol.
The effect of any quantum measurement can be repre-
sented by a set of operators {Ai} satisfying
∑
iAiA
†
i = 1 .
If the initial state is ρ, the probability for any outcome,
say i, is
pi = tr(AiρA
†
i ), (12)
and the state is transformed into
ρi =
1
pi
AiρA
†
i . (13)
Consider the states (10). The POVM described by the
operators (11) can be effectively replaced by a sequence
of two two-outcome measurements. First, one applies a
measurement described by the operators
Aok ≡ 1√
1 + cos η
(|+ x〉〈ψ⊥1 |+ | − x〉〈ψ⊥0 |)
A? ≡
√
1 −AokA†ok. (14)
The effect of this first measurement is the following: with
probability pok = 1−cosη the state |ψ0〉 (|ψ1〉) is mapped
into |+ x〉 (| − x〉). This operation is often called a fil-
tering, and it is equivalent to the cases where the POVM
(11) gives a conclusive result. When the outcome ok
has been obtained, it is said that the states have passed
the filter. If this is the case, a standard von Neumann
measurement on the x basis suffices for discriminating
between the two states.
Let us come back to the 4+2 protocol and consider the
filter for the states in set a, sending these state into the
x basis. It is not difficult to see that the same filter maps
the states in set b into | ± y〉. Therefore, a BB84-like
situation is recovered!
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It is now easy to design a PNS attack. First, Eve
counts the number of photons. Similar to the B92 case,
she applies the filtering two-outcome measurement when
a multi-photon pulse is obtained. When the result is
conclusive, she keeps the resulting photon in a quantum
memory and forwards the rest of photons to Bob. Then,
as in the BB84 case, she waits for the basis reconcilia-
tion, and performs the right von Neumann measurement
allowing her to read the bit. In order to make a fair
comparison, we always impose the same key rate in the
absence of Eve as in BB84 using µ = 0.1. In this case
this means that we must have
µBB84 = µ4+2(1− cos η). (15)
In a similar way as above for the BB84 case, one can
compute Eve’s information for this attack. It almost co-
incides with the one found for the BB84 protocol, and
the critical distance is again δc = 52 km (see figure 1).
Indeed, the critical distance turns out to be quite inde-
pendent of the degree of non-orthogonality between the
states in the 4+2 protocol, if one imposes the equality of
the raw rates (15).
The analysis of the 4+2 protocol ends the present sec-
tion. All the studied QKD schemes do not guarantee a
secure key distillation when the channel attenuation is
around 15 dB. Unfortunately, the use of non-orthogonal
states has not been enough for avoiding Eve’s attacks.
The critical distance basically corresponds to the point
where the raw rate on Bob’s side can be simulated by the
number of multi-photon pulses leaving Alice’s lab.
D. Strong pulse implementations
The three protocols analyzed in the previous sections
are not robust against PNS attacks in a weak coherent
pulse implementation. Eve exploits the presence of multi-
photon pulses and the losses on the line. Indeed, at the
critical distance the losses are such that she can block
the pulse without being noticed when her attack has not
succeeded. A possible way of avoiding this problem is to
send also a strong reference pulse that must always be de-
tected on Bob’s side, as in the original B92 proposal [10].
In this way, Eve cannot block the pulses without intro-
ducing errors. From the implementation point of view, a
new detector should be added, checking the presence of
the strong pulse. In the following lines we consider these
implementations from the point of view of PNS attacks.
We mainly concentrate on the B92 protocol although, as
we will see, the same conclusions are valid for the other
schemes.
The information encoding uses the relative phase be-
tween a weak coherent pulse with respect to a strong ref-
erence pulse that is sent later through the line. Thus, Al-
ice prepares a weak coherent pulse and a strong pulse sent
as a reference, |φ〉 = |µ′eiθ〉|µeiθeiφ〉, where µ′ ≫ µ and
φ = 0, pi encodes the classical bit. For a BB84 scheme,
φ = 0, pi for one of the basis and φ = ±pi/2 for the other.
Note that the BB84 implementation with a strong pulse
is indeed the 4+2 scheme [11]. Let us come back to the
simplest B92 and denote by t the ratio between the two
intensities t = µ/µ′ ≪ 1. The overlap between the two
non-orthogonal states is |〈0|pi〉| = e−2µ, so µ < 1. Bob
delays the weak pulse and makes it interfere with a frac-
tion t of the strong pulse. Constructive and destructive
interference correspond to the values 0 and pi. The prob-
ability of inconclusive result is p? = e
−2µ as expected
(see [23] for a practical implementation of this measure-
ment), and the transmission rate for small µ is ∼ 2µ [11].
The detection of the 1 − t <∼ 1 fraction of the strong
reference pulse by Bob should allow him to detect Eve’s
intervention, i.e. none of the pulses can be blocked. Note
that this forces the strong pulse mean photon number to
be significant at Bob’s side. However, Eve can always
take advantage of the multi-photon pulses for acquiring
partial information.
Since as usual there is no global phase reference avail-
able, the effective state leaving Alice’s lab is
ρ =
∫
dθ
2pi
|φ〉〈φ| =
∑
n
p(n, µ+ µ′)|ϕn(φ)〉〈ϕn(φ)|, (16)
where p(n, µ+ µ′) are Poisson probabilities and
|ϕn(φ)〉 =
n∑
m=0
√(
n
m
)
tm
(1 + t)n
eimφ|n−m〉|m〉. (17)
In a similar way as above, one can define
a†(φ) =
1√
1 + t
(
a†1 +
√
teiφa†2
)
a(φ) =
1√
1 + t
(
a1 +
√
te−iφa2
)
, (18)
such that acting on the two-mode vacuum state gives
a†(φ)|0, 0〉 = |ϕ1(φ)〉. Again, we have
|ϕn(φ)〉 = (a
†(φ))n√
n!
|0, 0〉, (19)
[a†, a] = 1 and 〈ϕn′(φ)|ϕn(φ)〉 = δn,n′ . Eve can perform
a non-demolition measurement for these number states
without being detected by Bob. Indeed, his state is the
same as in Eq. (16), just taking into account the channel
attenuation.
Denote the channel losses by δ. Since µ′ ≫ µ, Eve’s
Poisson distribution is centered around µ′ while Bob’s
around µ′10−δ/10. Moreover the strong pulse must be al-
ways detected by Bob, so we will impose µ′10−δ/10 = 10
(at least), which means that µ′ = 10(1+δ/10). In order
to make a fair comparison with the BB84 scheme using
µ = 0.1, we take the same raw rate in the absence of Eve
at the critical distance, which leads to
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µBB84
2
= 2µB92, (20)
and then µB92 = 0.025, i.e. |〈0|pi〉| = 0.95, and t =
10−(2+δ/10)/4.
Now, Eve performs the measurement in the |ϕn〉 basis.
Since her Poisson probability is centered around µ′, she
obtains a pulse containing (on average) µ′ photons. On
Bob’s side a pulse with ten photons is expected, so Eve
keeps |ϕµ′−10〉 and forwards |ϕ10〉 to Bob by her lossless
line. Eve’s intervention remains unnoticed to Bob. Eve
is now faced with the problem of detecting two states
having an overlap
|〈ϕµ′−10(pi)|ϕµ′−10(0)〉| =
(
1− t
1 + t
)µ′−10
∼
(
1− t
1 + t
)µ′
.
(21)
She applies the measurement maximizing her information
[24], obtaining
IEve = I(pe), (22)
where I(p) = 1+ log2 p+(1− p) log2(1− p) is the binary
mutual information (in bits) and pe is the error proba-
bility,
pe =
1
2
(
1−
√
1− |〈ϕµ′−10(pi)|ϕµ′−10(0)〉|2
)
. (23)
It is not hard to compute the limit for Eve’s information.
For very large distances, µ′ →∞ and then
|〈ϕµ′ (pi)|ϕµ′ (0)〉| = lim
µ′→∞
(
1− µ/µ′
1 + µ/µ′
)µ′
= e−2µ, (24)
i.e. the initial overlap gives the searched limit and
IEve ∼ 0.07 bits. Thus, for any distance, the protocol is
clearly secure against PNS attacks. The same is valid for
the strong pulse realization of the BB84 protocol, which,
as said, is the 4+2 scheme.
Note that strong pulse implementations appear as an
intermediate step in the transition from discrete to con-
tinuous variables QKD schemes using coherent states [5].
There, a strong reference pulse, with very large mean
photon number µ′, is sent through the channel with a
weaker pulse, containing about hundred photons. The
security comes from the fact that although µ is not weak,
an infinite range of values is used for the information en-
coding (while, for example, we have only two in the B92
case) and Eve is not able to discriminate the sent state.
However, many of the results presented in this section can
be translated to these protocols, opening the possibility
of new eavesdropping attacks [25].
Before ending this section let us stress an important
point about strong pulse QKD implementations that was
somehow hidden in the previous discussion. It is impor-
tant to guarantee a reasonable photon number for the
strong pulse on Bob’s side, i.e. the condition µ′10−δ/10 ∼
10 must be always satisfied. Therefore, µ′ increases with
the distance up to which the key should be established.
Note that µ is just fixed by the desired overlap between
the two states used in the B92 scheme, independently of
the distance. In the previous lines we took a quite conser-
vative value, coming from Eq. (20). We can indeed con-
sider µ = 1/4, which gives |〈0|pi〉| = 0.6 and IEve ∼ 0.5.
This forces µ′ and the ratio t to increase with the dis-
tance, which can lead to problems in the interferometric
arrangement needed for detection. For instance for a dis-
tance of 80 km, that taking as usual α = 0.25 means 20
dB, we have µ′ = 103 and t = 10−4/4. However if these
requirements are met, a secure implementation becomes
possible with a key generation rate significantly larger
than for the BB84 scheme using µ = 0.1.
For the rest of the article however, we will not consider
this type of scenario and we will deal only with imple-
mentations using weak coherent pulses.
III. QKD PROTOCOLS RESISTANT TO PNS
ATTACKS
The aim of the present section is to give QKD protocols
resistant to the PNS attack in a weak pulse implemen-
tation. From the previous discussion we can understand
some of the basic requirement for these schemes. We
have seen above that the apparent robustness of the 4+2
protocol was not true due to the existence of a quantum
operation (measurement), represented by (14), that al-
lows Eve to make pairwise orthogonal the states in the
sets a and b. After successfully performing this opera-
tion, she can wait for the basis reconciliation, as in the
BB84 case, and read the information by a von Neumann
measurement. Therefore, what Alice needs is a configura-
tion of sets of states in which to encode her information
such that there does not exist any quantum operation
increasing, even with some probability and at the same
time, the overlap of the states in each set. This is what
a protocol needs to be resistant to the PNS attack.
A simple configuration achieving this property is the
same as in the 4+2, but with one of the two set of states
reflected with respect to the xy plane (see figure 2). But,
even simpler, one can restrict oneself to any plane in the
Bloch sphere, as in the BB84 case. This situation is de-
picted in figure 3. The general expression for these states
is
|0a〉 =
(
cos η2
sin η2
)
|1a〉 =
(
cos η2
− sin η2
)
|0b〉 =
(
sin η2
− cos η2
)
|1b〉 =
(
sin η2
cos η2
)
(25)
After successfully application of the filter that makes or-
thogonal the states in set a, the overlap between the
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states in set b has significantly increased. Indeed, it is
not difficult to see that if the outcome of a quantum op-
eration, say Ai, makes orthogonal the states of set a, for
the same outcome the states in set b are less orthogonal
(see appendix A). So, now Eve has to consider two dif-
ferent filters, Fa and Fb, that make the states in set a
and set b orthogonal, respectively. If she wants to get
the whole information about the bit sent by Alice, she
has to block all the pulses with less than three photons.
When the pulse contains three photons, she applies Fa to
the first one, Fb to the second one, and only when both
of them are conclusive, she forwards the third photon to
Bob. It is clear that the distance where Eve can perform
this attack without being detected is much larger than
above. It basically corresponds to the point where the
raw rate is equal to the number of pulses on Alice’s side
with more than two photons. There, Eve can simulate
the expected raw rate using only these pulses.
x
z
0a1a
0b 1b
x
z
0’a1’a
1’b0’b
FIG. 3. States configuration for a QKD protocol robust to
PNS attacks.
Using this idea, we can design different state configu-
rations. One of them turns out to be equivalent, at the
quantum level, to the BB84 scheme. The states and the
measurements are the same as in this protocol, the only
difference being in the reconciliation process. But, sur-
prisingly, this variation makes the protocol significantly
more resistant to PNS attacks. The remaining of this
section will be devoted to the detailed security analysis
of this protocol.
A. Four-state protocol
The configuration of states in figure 3 allows Alice and
Bob to exchange a key in a secure way for larger distance
than for many of the existing protocols. In the case in
which the angle between the states in each set is pi/2
we recover a BB84-like state configuration. Neverthe-
less, note that Alice’s bit encoding has radically changed
(see figure 3), since orthogonal states encode the same
classical bit.
Suppose as in the standard BB84 that Alice uses as
information carriers the eigenvectors of σx and σy . Now,
the bit 0 is encoded into | ± x〉 and 1 into | ± y〉. Con-
sider the case in which Alice’s bit is equal to zero. She
chooses randomly between | ± x〉 and sends the state,
say |+ x〉, to Bob. Bob measures randomly in the x or
y basis. After this, Alice starts the reconciliation pro-
cess announcing the sent state and one of the two pos-
sible states encoding one, for instance {|+ x〉, |+ y〉}. If
Bob’s measurement was in the x basis, the result was +1
(remember that the sent state was |+ x〉) and he can-
not discriminate between the two alternatives. If Bob
measured in the y basis, for half of the cases the result
was +1 and for the rest -1. In the first case, he cannot
discriminate either, but in the latter, he knows for sure
that the sent bit was not |+ y〉, and accepts the sent bit.
At first sight this is just a simple, and not very useful,
modification of the BB84 protocol. However with these
variations the obtained protocol is much more resistant
to Eve’s attacks.
Eve is faced with the following problem: after Alice’s
announcement she will have to deal with one of four pos-
sible sets of two states,
s1 ≡ {+x,+y} s2 ≡ {+y,−x}
s3 ≡ {−x,−y} s4 ≡ {−y,+x}. (26)
Eve can unambiguously determine the sent state with
some probability for all the pulses of at least three pho-
tons. Indeed she measures in the x and y basis the
two first photons, which allows her to discard two of the
possibilities. Then, she applies to the third photon the
measurement discriminating between the two remaining
states. This intuitively shows that this scheme is more ro-
bust against PNS attacks, since only three-photon pulses
provide her with the full information. In the next lines
we will extend these ideas in a more precise way, show-
ing that the distance for a secure implementation of this
protocol is approximately twice the one for the standard
BB84. First we deal with attacks exploiting the pres-
ence of multi-photon pulses without introducing errors
on Bob’s side. Then we move to cloning-based attacks,
where some error is allowed, and finally we analyze the
combined action of these two eavesdropping strategies.
B. PNS attacks
The first type of attacks we consider are of the same
type as the PNS attack for the BB84. Eve uses the multi-
photon pulses for acquiring information. However, her
attack cannot be noticed by the honest parties because
of their limited technological powers, i.e. she must not
introduce errors on Bob’s side.
As shown above, Eve can determine unambiguously
the state sent by Alice when the pulse contains more
than three photons. This is indeed a general result: un-
ambiguous discrimination between N states of a two-
dimensional Hilbert space is only possible when at least
N − 1 copies of the state are available [26]. In this
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case, the N states |ψi〉⊗(N−1) belong to the symmet-
ric subspace of (C
2
)⊗(N−1) of dimension N . Since the
N states are always linearly independent (see appendix
B), unambiguous discrimination is possible. Above we
have described a sequence of measurements allowing un-
ambiguous discrimination between three copies of the
four states | ± x〉, | ± y〉. The probability of success is
given by the third measurement that discriminates be-
tween two quantum states having an overlap of 1/
√
2,
i.e. pok = 1 − 1/
√
2 ∼ 0.3. However, better strategies
should be expected if one acts globally on the three copies
of the unknown state. For instance, one can use the nat-
ural generalization of the POVM described by Eqs. (11).
For any i = ±x,±y one can define |ψ⊥i 〉 ∈ (C2)⊗3sym as the
state orthogonal to the three vectors |ψj〉⊗3, with j 6= i.
Then, the searched measurement is given by the five pos-
itive operators summing up to the identity of (C
2
)⊗3sym,
denoted by 1 3,sym,
Πi =
2
3
|ψ⊥i 〉〈ψ⊥i |
Π? = 1 3,sym −
∑
i
Πi. (27)
The probability of having an inconclusive result is, where
|i (3)〉 = |i〉⊗3,
p? = 〈i (3)|Π?|i (3)〉 = 1
2
. (28)
Indeed, this measurement is optimal if we impose that
the probability of conclusive result has to be the same
for the four possibilities to be distinguished. From [27]
we know that the maximal probability of unambiguous
discrimination is equal to the reciprocal of the maximum
eigenvalue of the operator
1
4
∑
i=±x,±y
(|ψ⊥i 〉〈ψ⊥i |), (29)
which gives pok = 1/2 [28].
Eve’s first strategy will consist of counting the number
of photons on each pulse and block those with less than
three photons. When at least three photons are detected,
she performs the previous measurements and blocks all
the instances where an inconclusive result is obtained.
When she is able to determine the state, she can prepare
a new copy of it for Bob. Again, if the channel losses are
small, she must apply this strategy on a fraction of the
pulses. The corresponding equations are quite similar to
the ones seen above, and the critical distance corresponds
to the point where
RBob = p
max
ok
∞∑
n=3
pn(n− 2). (30)
Eve’s information is shown in figure 4, and the critical
distance turns out to be of approximately 100 km. Note
that we take µ = 0.2, in order to make a fair comparison
with BB84 using µ = 0.1.
It is evident that for small distances, this strategy is
quite inefficient from Eve’s point of view. Indeed, for
those instances it is better for her to apply a different
PNS attack, that we call storing attack: all single-photon
pulses are blocked, while for all the multi-photon pulses,
she keeps one photon in a quantum memory until the
set reconciliation. Then, she has to distinguish between
two non-orthogonal quantum states, say |+ x〉 and |+ z〉.
She will apply the measurement maximizing her infor-
mation obtaining (see Eq. 22)) Ieve ∼ 0.4 and where the
error probability is
pe =
1
2
(
1−
√
1− |〈+x|+ z〉|2
)
∼ 0.14. (31)
Storing attacks are particularly dangerous as soon as
there are errors in the transmission. If this is the case,
the information IAB is smaller than one and indeed, it
may be smaller than Eve’s information (see section IV
for a more careful analysis). In a similar way to that de-
scribed above, depending on the channel losses, Eve can
interpolate between these two attacks. The correspond-
ing information curves are shown in figure 4.
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FIG. 4. The figure shows different eavesdropping attacks
that take advantage of the presence of multi-photon pulses
for the new four-state protocol. The dashed line represents
the attack where all pulses with less than three photons are
blocked. Eve can however interpolates between different at-
tacks as described in the text, depending on the channel
losses. The solid line is Eve’s information for this second
possibility.
The presence of multi-photon pulses represents a se-
rious drawback, since Eve can take advantage of them
for acquiring information on the sent bit. Since we do
not consider advantage distillation protocols, the honest
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parties can extract a key when Eq. (2) is satisfied. This
means that the secret bit rate generation, after error cor-
rection and privacy amplification, is
Rkey =
1
4
RBob(1− IEve), (32)
where RBob is the raw rate of Eq. (3). The 1/4 term
takes into account the set reconciliation process (Bob has
to choose the right measurement and obtain the right
outcome), and the last term comes from the privacy am-
plification protocol. Note that we assume for simplicity
no errors between Alice and Bob, IAB = 1.
There is in principle an obvious way of avoiding the
influence of multi-photon pulses: to decrease the pulse
mean photon number. Nevertheless, this solution may
be very inefficient, since the raw rate, RBob, is approxi-
mately proportional to µ. Therefore, there is a compro-
mise from the point of view of key generation. Using the
same techniques as for figure 4, for any δ one can com-
pute the optimal µ maximizing Rkey . The corresponding
curve is shown in figure 5. Note that mean photon num-
bers of the order of 0.2 are indeed optimal for losses ∼ 20
dB.
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FIG. 5. The figure shows the mean photon number maxi-
mizing the key rate generation, Eq. (32), as a function of the
distance. For small distances one cannot take µ arbitrarily
large, since the four states would become almost orthogonal
and Eve could do an intercept-resend attack without being
detected. For large distances, µ cannot be arbitrarily small,
since the signal becomes negligible with respect to dark counts
and the channel is completely noisy, IAB ∼ 0.
C. Individual attacks using cloning machines
All the eavesdropping strategies studied up to now take
advantage of the fact that the technological power for the
honest parties has some limitations. In particular, Eve
uses the multi-photon pulses for acquiring information
on the sent bit without introducing any error. Neverthe-
less, the present protocol must be also analyzed under
the presence of errors, even at the single-photon level.
It may happen that a small amount of error would al-
low Eve to gain a large amount of information making
the protocol unpractical. Indeed, these are the attacks
Eve would apply at very short distances, where she can-
not block almost any pulse and almost all the non-empty
pulses reaching Bob contain just one photon.
The optimal individual eavesdropping strategy for this
protocol is unknown. Nevertheless, note that the quan-
tum structure is the same as for the BB84 scheme, so
it seems natural to consider its robustness against at-
tacks using asymmetric phase covariant cloning machines
[29,30]. These machines, that are briefly described in ap-
pendix C, clone in an optimal way all the states in the xy
plane. Let us stress here that they provide the optimal
eavesdropping for the BB84 protocol [31]. The action of
these machines in the protocol is depicted in figure 6.
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FIG. 6. The figure shows Alice’s and Bob’s vs Eve’s in-
formation for individual attacks using the cloning machines
introduced by Cerf and Niu and Griffiths. The curve for the
standard BB84 scheme is included for comparison.
Key distillation using privacy amplification is possible
whenever Eq (2) is fulfilled. This means that the hon-
est parties can tolerate an error up to ∼ 15%, slightly
larger than the 14.67% for the BB84. There are two
facts in these curves that deserve explanation. First, note
that the Cerf cloning machine [29] is clearly more efficient
from Eve’s point of view than the Niu-Griffiths one [30].
Second, note the surprising decreasing behavior of Eve’s
information for large values of the QBER. Both of them
are related to the quantum correlations introduced by
each of the cloning machines between Eve and Bob, and
the sifting procedure used in the described protocol.
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Eve waits until the sifting process before doing
her measurement. If, for instance, Alice announces
|+ x〉, |+ y〉 and Bob accepts the symbol, Eve knows
that Bob has successfully projected onto either | − x〉 or
| − y〉. Then, she modifies her quantum state accord-
ing to this information. The fact that Bob has got a
conclusive result (he could discriminate between the two
non-orthogonal states) increases also the distinguishabil-
ity on Eve’s side because of the quantum correlations.
On the one hand, this justifies why the Cerf cloning ma-
chine is more efficient for eavesdropping. It establishes a
stronger correlation between Eve and Bob, and this helps
Eve after the sifting process. On the other hand, this
also explains the decreasing behavior of Eve’s informa-
tion curves. For very large disturbances, the correlations
between Eve and Bob decreased, and knowing that Bob
has obtained a conclusive result does not help her too
much. Thus, it is better to keep some quantum correla-
tions with Bob, in such a way that his successful unam-
biguous discrimination increases the distinguishability on
Eve’s side. In the limiting case of QBER = 0.5, Eve just
takes the state sent by Alice and prepares at random one
of the four possible states for Bob (or in equivalent terms,
she forwards a completely noisy state). Her information
is simply given by Eq. (22) as expected.
D. PNS+cloning attacks
The eavesdropping strategies analyzed up to now take
advantage, either of the presence of multi-photon pulses
(PNS attacks) or of the errors on Bob’s side (cloning at-
tacks). However for losses such that Eve can simulate
the expected rate even if she blocks all the single-photon
pulses, she can combine the two type of attacks, if she
is allowed to introduce some errors. This basically cor-
responds to distances d >∼ 40 km (see figure 4). There,
Eve counts the number of photons in the pulse and stops
those having one photon. For all the two-photon pulses,
she applies an asymmetric phase covariant 2→ 3 cloning
machine, and forwards one of the clones to Bob. This
operation introduces errors, depending on the quality of
Bob’s clone. In general, for a pulse having n photons,
she uses an n→ n+ 1 cloning machine, although in this
section we consider only the 2 → 3 case, since p2 is sig-
nificantly larger than p3. As far as we know this type of
attack has been never considered before. This may ex-
plain why the expression for the phase covariant n→ m
asymmetric cloning machine is unknown (at least to us).
In appendix D we describe two unitary transformations
generalizing, in a non-optimal way, the asymmetric 1→ 2
cloning machines to the 2→ 3 case (see also [32,33]).
Eve counts the number of photons in the pulse. All the
single-photon pulses are blocked, while for those pulses
having two photons she applies one of the 2→ 3 cloning
machines shown in appendix D. In this case it is unclear
which of the clone states she has to forward to Bob. It
turns out that for small disturbances, such that Eve’s
information is smaller than IAB, there is almost no dif-
ference between the two cases. Figure 7 shows the infor-
mation Eve can get with this strategy as a function of the
disturbance on Bob’s side. We consider that Bob receives
one of the two clones with the same fidelity, i.e. either the
first or the second qubit of Eq. (55) or (56). Key distil-
lation is possible using error correction and one-way pri-
vacy amplification up to disturbances of approximately
8.5%.
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FIG. 7. The figure shows Alice’s and Bob’s vs Eve’s infor-
mation for attacks using the cloning machines described in
appendix D. Upper curves correspond to the cloning machine
of Eq. (55), which is more powerful from Eve’s point of view.
E. The Geneva-Lausanne experiment
The four-state protocol is at the level of state prepara-
tions and measurements, identical to the BB84 scheme.
It only differs in the sifting process, less efficient in the
absence of Eve by a factor of two on the raw key, but
more robust against PNS attacks. Thus, all the existent
experimental implementations of the BB84 protocol can
be thought of as implementations of the new four-state
protocol.
Let us analyze the recent Geneva-Lausanne experiment
[13], where a key was distributed over 67 km using the
BB84 scheme. The mean photon number of the pulses
used in this experiment was indeed 0.2 photons/pulse,
so all our results directly apply. According to figure
1, the protocol is not secure at this distance because of
the PNS attack even for µ = 0.1 (and BB84 encoding).
However this is not the case if one uses the new pro-
tocol. The experimental QBER was approximately 5%,
where 4% was due to dark counts on the detector and
10
1% due to optical imperfections. As said above, Eve is
assumed to have only access to the optical error. Then
IAB = I(0.05) ∼ 0.71 bits, while IEve (see figure 7) is
clearly smaller than 0.5. Thus, Alice and Bob can safely
distill a key. Note that even in the more restrictive sce-
nario where Eve can take advantage of the full error (in-
cluding the detector noise), her information is smaller
than IAB and the protocol is secure. Therefore, the ex-
isting implementation becomes secure just by changing
the sifting process.
IV. GENERALIZATION TO MORE SETS
The detailed analysis of the four-state protocol has
given us insight into the way of designing QKD protocols
resistant to PNS attacks. The presence of multi-photon
pulses is still a problem, since they open the possibility
of unambiguous discrimination or storing attacks provid-
ing Eve full or partial information. But there is a simple
way of improving the robustness of the protocol: just
adding more states for the encoding. A quite natural
generalization of the previous protocol follows this idea
and consists of adding more bases in a plane of the Bloch
sphere for the encoding of the bit, as shown in figure
8 for the case of four bases (eight states). On the one
hand more photons (or copies of the unknown state) are
needed for the unambiguous discrimination to be pos-
sible. On the other hand the overlap between the two
announced states decreases, which is also good against
storing attacks. Nevertheless, the key rate decreases un-
less we use a larger mean photon number, which increases
the presence of multi-photon pulses, that are dangerous
for the security. Thus, a compromise appears. The aim
of this section is to explore this fact by analyzing the
resistance of this generalized protocols against the two
type of attacks mentioned above: PNS with unambigu-
ous discrimination and storing attacks.
Any protocol is uniquely defined by the number of
bases nb used for the bit encoding. We will not con-
sider a very large number of bases, since the protocol
would become impractical. In the previous sections we
had nb = 2 while nb = 4 for the protocol in figure 8. If
Alice wants to send a bit b, she chooses at random be-
tween the nb states encoding b and sends it to Bob. Bob
measures at random in any of the nb bases. Then, Al-
ice announces the sent state plus, again randomly, one of
the two neighboring states (encoding 1− b). Bob accepts
the bit when (i) he has measured in one of the two bases
associated to the two states announced by Alice and (ii)
his measurement outcome is orthogonal to one of these
states. Indeed, this allows him to discard one of the two
possibilities and to infer b. Thus, Bob needs to choose the
right measurement and obtain the right outcome, which
happens with probability
pb =
1
nb
sin2
(
pi
2nb
)
. (33)
As usual, in order to make a fair comparison, we impose
for any protocol that at very large distances (attenua-
tions) the raw rate is the same as in the standard BB84
with µ = 0.1. This implies that
µ(nb) =
1
20pb
=
nb
20 sin2
(
pi
2nb
) . (34)
Note that for large nb, µ(nb) ∼ n3b . This means that the
mean photon number becomes significant when nb in-
creases and we are not longer dealing with weak pulses.
Therefore, some of the approximations used above (see
[19]) are not valid.
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FIG. 8. Bit encoding in a protocol using four bases.
Eve has now to discriminate between 2nb one-qubit
states, and this can be done with certainty only when
ne = 2nb − 1 copies of the unknown state are available
(see [26] and appendix B). The maximum probability of
success, pok, correspond to the maximum eigenvalue of
the operator [27]
1
2nb
ne∑
k=0
|k⊥〉〈k⊥|. (35)
Here |k⊥〉 denotes the state in (C2)⊗nesym orthogonal to all
|j〉⊗ne , where j = 0, . . . , ne but j 6= k and
|k〉 = 1√
2
(
1
ei kpi/nb
)
. (36)
We have numerically calculated these probabilities up to
nb = 8 and they appear to be given by the formula
pok(nb) = nb/4
nb−1, although we do not have an ana-
lytical proof. The critical attenuation δ1 (in dB) where
the protocol ceases to be secure against this attack has
to be such that Eve can simulate the expected rate by
the number of pulses containing at least ne photons and
giving a conclusive result. This leads to∑
n>0
p(n, µ(nb)10
−δ1/10)(1− (1− ηdet)n) =
pok(nb)
∑
m≥ne
p(m,µ(nb))(1− (1 − ηdet)(m−ne+1)). (37)
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The corresponding curve is shown in figure 9.
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FIG. 9. Critical distance for protocols using nb bases. Up-
per curve is given by PNS attacks using unambiguous discrim-
ination, while the lower curve corresponds to storing attacks,
as explained in the text. Storing attacks are clearly more
efficient from Eve’s point of view.
There are other attacks, exploiting the presence of
multi-photon pulses, that provide Eve with partial in-
formation without introducing errors. For instance, Eve
can count the number of photons and keep ns, depend-
ing on the channel attenuation, without being detected.
She waits until the basis reconciliation and performs the
measurement maximizing her information (see Eq. (22)).
These attacks can be very dangerous as soon as we con-
sider errors on the transmission. We assume that the
main sources of errors are the detector noise, quantified
by the probability pd of having a dark count, and the
optical error QBERopt. The total QBER for a channel
attenuation of δ is approximately equal to
QBER =
pd/2
pd + µ(nb)ηdet10−δ/10
+QBERopt , (38)
since half of the dark counts produce a click in the
wrong detector. Thus, for any distance one can com-
pute the amount of errors and the corresponding IAB =
I(QBER). If IEve is larger than IAB, the protocol is not
secure. For any ns, we can define a critical attenuation
such that the honest parties cannot notice Eve’s storing
attack. This attenuation corresponds to the point where∑
n>0
p(n, µ(nb)10
−δ(ns)/10)(1− (1 − ηdet)n) =
∑
m≥ns
p(m,µ(nb))(1 − (1− ηdet)(m−ns)). (39)
For intermediate attenuations (distances), Eve can in-
terpolate between two attacks, as described above. In
this way, we can compute the two curves IAB and IEve
as a function of the distance. Figure 10 shows the ob-
tained results, where we took ηdet = 0.1, pd = 10
−5 and
QBERopt = 1%. The point where IAB = IEve provides
the critical distance, δ2, for this type of attacks. In figure
9 we plot both the δ1 and δ2 as a function of nb. It is
quite plausible that min(δ1, δ2) gives a good estimation
for δc, the critical distance associated to the unknown
optimal attack. Thus, one can safely conclude that a key
can be established using a reasonable number of bases up
to distances of the order of 150 km [35].
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FIG. 10. Information curves as a function of the distance
for protocols using nb = 2, . . . , 5 bases. Solid lines represent
the information Alice-Bob: at large distances, the signal level
is small compared to dark counts and the QBER becomes im-
portant (see Eq. (38)). Dashed lines show Eve’s information:
at large distances, she can keep many photons without being
detected, acquiring more information on the sent state. The
point where the two curves cross defines the critical distance
where the protocol is no longer secure.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Unconditional security of quantum cryptography relies
on some experimental assumptions that are not achiev-
able with present-day technology. Thus, in a more real-
istic scenario, the honest parties have to deal with ap-
proximated single-photon sources, noisy channels, inef-
ficient detectors and so on, while no limitation on the
eavesdropper technology should be assumed. This opens
the possibility for alternative eavesdropping attacks, tak-
ing advantage of Alice and Bob’s technological imperfec-
tions. Indeed, using as a reference the BB84 scheme with
µ = 0.1, all the known protocols become insecure against
PNS attacks for channel losses of the order of 13 dB.
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In this article we show how to construct QKD protocols
resistant against PNS attacks up to channel losses of 40
dB. There are two possibilities for that: (i) to exploit the
non-orthogonality of quantum states in a different way,
as in the presented four-state protocol or (ii) to include
a strong reference pulse that must be always detected
by Bob. Both possibilities seem achievable with current
technology. In the first case, already existent implemen-
tations of the BB84 protocol [13] provide an experimen-
tal demonstration of QKD secure against PNS attacks,
when the alternative sifting process is applied. The sec-
ond possibility shows a connection between discrete and
continuous variables QKD schemes that deserves further
investigation.
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APPENDIX A
In this appendix we show that the overlap between all
the states in figure 3 cannot be decreased by the same
quantum operation. Using the parametrization of Eq.
(25), one can see that
|0b〉 = c|0a〉+ c′|1a〉
|1b〉 = c′|0a〉+ c|1a〉, (40)
where
c = −cos η
sin η
c′ =
1
sin η
. (41)
Now, consider a quantum operation, M , mapping with
some probability pa the states in set a into some new
states, |0′a〉 and |1′a〉, such that 〈0′a|1′a〉 = 0. This means
that
M |ia〉 = 1√
p
a
|i′a〉, (42)
where i = 0, 1. Because of the linearity of Quantum Me-
chanics, the states in set b will be mapped into
|0′b〉 =
1√
pb
(c|0′a〉+ c′|1′a〉)
|1′b〉 =
1√
pb
(c′|0′a〉+ c|1′a〉), (43)
with probability
pb =
1 + cos2 η
sin2 η
1
pa
. (44)
Their overlap is
|〈0′b|1′b〉| =
2 cos η
1 + cos2 η
≥ cos η, (45)
i.e. the states in set b become less distinguishable.
APPENDIX B
In this appendix we will show that N − 1 copies of N
one-qubit state are always linearly independent (see also
[26]). Consider N − 1 copies of N − 1 general states of
one qubit, |ψi〉 with i = 1, . . . , N−1. They belong to the
symmetric subspace (C
2
)
⊗(N−1)
sym of dimension N . Our
aim now is to add a new state and to see when this state
can be written as a linear combination of the previous
ones. In other terms, we want to find a state |ψN 〉 ∈ C2
such that the determinant of the N ×N matrix(
|ψ1〉⊗(N−1) · · · |ψN−1〉⊗(N−1)|ψN 〉⊗(N−1)
)
(46)
is zero. Note that the norm of the state does not play
any role, so we can write
|ψN 〉 =
(
1
x
)
, (47)
where x is an unbounded complex number. Condition
(46) then gives an N − 1 degree polynomial equation on
x. There are N − 1 solutions, that correspond to the
N − 1 trivial cases |ψN 〉 = |ψi〉 for i = 1, . . . , N − 1.
Thus, N−1 copies of any N different one-qubit state are
always linearly independent.
APPENDIX C
In this appendix we briefly describe the asymmetric
phase covariant cloning machines introduced in [29,30].
These machine clone with maximal fidelity all the states
that lie in the xy plane. At first sight, their only differ-
ence is that the one in [29] uses as an input state a two-
qubit reference state plus the state to be cloned, while
for the second one qubit suffices as ancillary system.
Consider an input state to be cloned, and a one-qubit
ancillary system in a reference state, say |0〉. The Niu-
Griffiths cloning machine [30] is defined by the following
unitary transformation
UNG12 |00〉12 = |00〉
UNG12 |10〉12 = cos γ|10〉+ sin γ|01〉, (48)
with 0 ≤ γ ≤ pi/2. From the definition it is evident
that this transformation does not affect in the same way
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the two poles | ± z〉 of the Bloch sphere. Nevertheless,
this is not the case for those state lying in the xy plane,
i.e. |ϑ〉 = (|0〉 + eiϑ|1〉)/√2. The searched clones are
the mixed local states resulting from tracing either the
first or the second qubit on the state resulting from the
application of Eq. (48),
ρi = tr2−i(ΠNG(ϑ)), (49)
where i = 1, 2 and ΠNG(ϑ) is the projector onto
UNG|ϑ〉|0〉. One can easily see that ∀ϑ
ρ1 = cos γ|ϑ〉〈ϑ|+ (1 − cos γ) 1
2
ρ2 = sin γ|ϑ〉〈ϑ|+ (1− sin γ) 1
2
. (50)
Then, the corresponding clone fidelities, defined as Fi =
〈ϑ|ρi|ϑ〉, are (1 + cos γ)/2 and (1 + sin γ)/2. The larger
the fidelity for the first clone, the smaller for the sec-
ond. Equality is achieved when cos γ = sin γ, and then
F1 = F2 = (1 + 1/
√
2)/2.
The second type of cloning machine we consider are
those introduced in [29]. There, two qubits are used as
the ancillary system, and the unitary transformation is,
for any input state |ψ〉 ∈ C2,
UC12|ψ〉|00〉 = F |ψ〉|Φ+〉+ (1− F )σz |ψ〉|Φ−〉+√
F (1− F ) (σx|ψ〉|Ψ+〉+ iσy|ψ〉|Ψ−〉) , (51)
where
|Φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉)
|Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉) (52)
define the standard Bell basis. It is not difficult to see
that the local state in the first two qubits is the same as
in Eq. (49), if one takes F = (1 + cos γ)/2.
Eve can use these transformations in order to obtain
some information about the sent bit. She clones the state
sent by Alice, and she forwards the first clone to Bob
and keeps the second. Obviously there is a compromise
between the quality of the two clones: the better Eve’s
clone the worse Bob’s state. Or in other words, the more
the information intercepted by Eve, the more the errors
on Bob’s side, that allow the honest parties to detect
Eve’s intervention. As seen above, the two machines are
in many senses equivalent (especially as far as for the
cloning fidelities are concerned). However the two at-
tacks differ in the amount of correlations Eve establishes
with Bob. This fact is going to be very important for the
type of protocols analyzed in this work.
APPENDIX D
In this appendix we give two different unitary transfor-
mations that somehow generalizes the 1→ 2 asymmetric
cloning machines to the 2 → 3 case. The complete de-
scription of these machines will be given elsewhere [32].
The first machine is mainly inspired by Niu-Griffiths
construction. The initial input state corresponds to two
copies of an unknown one-qubit state, |ψ〉⊗2 ∈ (C2 ⊗
C
2
)sym. Using a two-dimensional ancillary system, say
in state |0〉, one can define the unitary operation
UNG23 |00〉|0〉 = |000〉
UNG23 |Φ+〉|0〉 =
cos γ(|010〉+ |100〉) + sin γ|001〉√
1 + cos2 γ
UNG23 |11〉|0〉 =
cos γ|110〉+ sin γ(|011〉+ |101〉)√
1 + sin2 γ
. (53)
As in the 1 → 2 case, this machine has not the same
effect on the states |0〉 and |1〉. After some lengthy al-
gebra one can see that all the states |ψ〉 in the xy plane
are cloned with the same fidelity. The local state of each
of the three qubits is a combination of the identity with
the initial pure state as expected, the fidelities being (see
also figure 11)
FNG1 = F
NG
2 =
1
2
+
cos γ
2
√
3 + cos(2γ)
+
1√
17− cos(4γ)
FNG3 =
1
2
+
sin γ
2
√
3 + cos(2γ)
+
sin(2γ)√
17− cos(4γ) . (54)
Note that when γ = pi/4, FNG1 = F
NG
3 = (6 + 2
√
2 +√
6)/12 ∼ 0.94, slightly larger than the fidelity of the
2 → 3 universal symmetric cloning of [34]. It has to be
stressed that the fidelity for the third clone never reaches
the value of one, contrary to what happens for the 1→ 2
case. As we learnt from the analysis of the individual
attacks, in the type of protocols we analyze it is more
convenient for Eve to introduce an extra ancillary sys-
tem in such a way that she is better correlated to Bob’s
result. This can be done introducing an ancillary sys-
tem on Eve’s side, such that the action on the states of
the computational basis is symmetrized. Note that in
the 1 → 2 case this procedure allows to pass from the
Niu-Griffiths to the Cerf cloning machine. The resulting
machine can be expressed as,
UNGs23 |s〉|00〉 = (UNG23 |s〉|0〉)|0〉+ (U˜NG23 |s〉|0〉)|1〉, (55)
where |s〉 = |00〉, |Φ+〉, |11〉 and U˜NG23 has the same form
as UNG23 but interchanging zeros and ones. The cloning
fidelities are again equal to Eq. (54).
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FIG. 11. Cloning fidelities for the 2 → 3 cloning machines
defined by Eqs. (53) (solid line) and (56) (dashed line). The
circles correspond to the points where the cloning fidelities
are equal.
The second machine we consider is based on the Cerf
construction [29]. As an input state we have two qubits
of an unknown one-qubit state plus a two-qubit ancillary
system. Then, we define the following unitary operation,
UC23|ψ〉⊗2|00〉 = v|ψ〉⊗2|Φ+〉+ x(σ˜z |ψ〉⊗2|Φ−〉+
σ˜x|ψ〉⊗2|Ψ+〉+ iσ˜y|ψ〉⊗2|Ψ−〉), (56)
where, for k = x, y, z,
σ˜k = σk ⊗ 1 + 1 ⊗ σk, (57)
and v2 + 8x2 = 1. One can see that for any input state
in the Bloch sphere, the local state of the first two qubits
are two identical clones with fidelity FC1 = F
C
2 = 1−2x2,
while in the third qubit we have another clone with fi-
delity FC3 = 1 − (v − 3x)2/2. Thus, the machine (56) is
an asymmetric universal cloning machine, i.e. not phase
covariant. Indeed, at the point where the three fidelities
are equal, we recover the 2 → 3 cloning fidelity of [34]
FC1 = F
C
3 = 11/12 (see also figure 11). Note also that in
this case, FC3 can be equal to one. Moreover, there are
some points where, for a given fidelity for the first two
clones, the fidelity for the third one is larger using this
cloning machine than for the phase covariant machine of
Eq. (53). This shows that the latter is not the optimal
phase covariant asymmetric 2→ 3 cloning machine. One
is tempted to generalize Cerf construction in a direct way,
defining a phase covariant machine by changing the co-
efficient of one of the error terms in (56). However, the
resulting operation is not unitary [32]. Therefore, we can
only propose two possible asymmetric phase covariant
machines, although we know that they are not optimal.
Nevertheless, it is quite reasonable to suppose that the
increase on Eve’s information will not be very significant
when using the, at present unknown, optimal one [33].
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